Minor update January 6, 2007
Added link to 1961 Ruppenthal paper.
Many, if not most, of these documents were never meant to be seen by the public. Hence the title of this page - Expose'. They came to me from many sources, some as gifts, some the result of diligent research (FOIA is a great tool) - and some by pure, blind luck. They are available to you here - for free - for browsing, reading, or downloading.
For corrections, criticisms, objections, or questions, contact me by e-mail at S. Woolsey.
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Smith-Quesada letters. Feb. 5, 1959 (208 Kb .pdf file)
Just 20 days after capitulating to the Air Line Pilots Association to end a strike that had severely crippled his airline, C.R. Smith (Chairman of American Airlines) writes to the FAA's new Administrator (a long-time personal friend), suggesting that the FAA act to impose a mandatory retirement age for airline pilots. American had previously lost an arbitration on the pilot retirement issue, and Smith's refusal to accede to the arbitrator's ruling had been an issue in the more recent strike.
In a later memorandum (no letterhead, sent to Quesada's home address), Smith provides data on transition training times required by his pilots as they moved into the newly arriving jet transports - Boeing B-707s.
Quesada had this transition training time data fashioned into charts that became central to his effort to justify the proposed rule. In a later review of these charts, however, the FAA's legal department judged them to be "extremely vulnerable to attack" by opponents - and recommended reliance on data concerning deteriorations in specific medical functions, instead. (See below: "Minutes of the Advisory Panel on Aging meeting" and "Review of Pilot Aging Charts by FAA's General Counsel's Office."
The best description (then or since) of the circumstances surrounding imposition of the Age 60 Rule appears in Ruppenthal, K.M., Compulsory Retirement of Air Line Pilots , 14 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev., 528 (1961) (20 pages, 2.8MB .pdf file).
Ruppenthal was a former airline pilot, an attorney, and a professor of Transportation Studies in Stanford's Business School when he wrote this article. [As an aside - and a bit of human interest - Ruppenthal's daughter, Sarah, was the first wife of Jerry Garcia, legendary leader of the Grateful Dead rock band.]
For a description of the Air Line Pilots Association's industry-wide contract objectives and strategies in the early 1950s (including pursuit of expanded retirement programs), see Ch. 6 of Baitsell, J.M., Airline Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Mass., 1966, Lib. of Cong. #66-22597
Rough Draft (J.H. Britten, MD) Feb. 16, 1959 (400 Kb .pdf file)
Eleven days after Smith's initial ex-parte request, a rough draft of a medical rationale has been prepared.
Reighard suggests proficiency checks. Mar. 9, 1959 (256 Kb .pdf file)
Soon to become a major player in this effort, Dr. Reighard's initial suggestion of "ability to perform adequately under realistic flight conditions" being a "reasonable test" [made also by others - see the Hesburg letter, below], was never seriously considered.
Quesada-Hesburg letters. Mar. 30, 1959 (348 Kb .pdf file)
Responding to criticism from The Reverend Theodore Hesburg, President of Notre Dame, Quesada defends his proposed rule while admitting that "there exists at present no sound scientific evidence that airline pilots . . . become critically unsafe at any given age."
Quesada-ALPA letters. Apr. 3, 1959 (704 Kb .pdf file)
Quesada approaches ALPA's President, Clarence N. Sayen, seeking ALPA's acceptance of his proposals. Quesada suggests, as an alternative, what he has already placed in motion - a regulatory solution.
Minutes of the "Advisory Panel on Aging" meeting. Jun. 8, 1959 (220 Kb .pdf file)
On June 3, Quesada convened a one-day meeting of selected aviation and medical experts who, on the basis of his "training time charts" (prepared from Smith's transition training data), promptly endorsed 60 for mandatory retirement and, after some debate, age 55 for transition into jets.
Recent statement of Dr. James Birren Jan. 20, 1995 (80 Kb .pdf file)
Note: Not from the Reighard Files.
Some 35 years later, one of the original panelists declares that, unaware of the controversy surrounding the issue, the panel's agreement was for a temporary adoption.
Navy's comments on Quesada's age limitation proposals. Jun. 25, 1959 (552 Kb .pdf file)
At the Jun. 3rd meeting, the panelists were asked to submit comments within two weeks. Only that of the Navy's Admiral Hogan were in the Reighard files. Adm. Hogan recommends a maximum age of 50, although the Navy's age limit was then 62.
Note: On June 27, 1959, the FAA published its initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. See the "History" page to view a copy of this document.
Quesada's morbidity data for "white males" in 1957. Jul. 27, 1959 (152 Kb .pdf file)
Still seeking data with which to bolster his case, Quesada seeks morbidity data for the general population (not air carrier pilots). The information is provided (with qualifications) by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Quesada's bibliography justifying the Rule. Aug. 5, 1959 (268 Kb .pdf file)
Sayen (ALPA President) has asked to review the FAA's data supporting its proposed Rule (i.e., the "docket"). In response, Quesada provided a list of 41 references, and directed Sayen to the local library.
For a modern analysis of the cited docments, see the statement of an EEOC trial attorney, immediately below.
EEOC senior trial attorney researches and comments on the FAA's bibliography. 12 Oct. 1990 (192 Kb .pdf file)
NOTE: MODERN COMMENTARY
In the mid 1980s, EEOC established a dedicated litigation unit to challenge non-air carrier companies that relied on the Age 60 Rule as justification for mandatory age-based retirements for their corporate and test pilots. Shortly after retiring as Federal Air Surgeon, Dr. Reighard was hired by the Boeing Company as a defense witness. In a deposition for that suit (EEOC v. Boeing), Dr, Reighard produced the 1959 bibliography for possible use as a defense exhibit. [see: 1959-84, The Reighard Files on the Expose' page] EEOC attorney Bloomfield researched the studies cited, and reported her findings in a sworn declaration for a similar suit against the Lockheed Corporation. (EEOC v Lockheed Corp.)
After losing on a motion for summary judgment (see EEOC v. Boeing, 843 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir., 1988), Boeing settled rather than go to trial on the merits. Lockheed also settled, as did all the major aircraft companies. Only a few private companies with large corporate fleets chose trial - and all who did, lost. The military services, NASA, and other government agencies voluntarily abandoned their age-based pilot retirement policies. (Today, neither space shuttle pilots, nor those flying the President on Air Force One are subject to a maximum age limit.) By the mid 1990's, NO mandatory age-based pilot retirement practices existed anywhere in the U.S. (industry or government - state or federal) except in the Part 121 (large aircraft) air carrier operations.
Report on foreign pilot retirement policies. Aug. 19, 1959 (728 Kb .pdf file)
Although many major international air carriers had varying retirement age limits, only Spain had a (then recently enacted) government imposed limit of age 55. The author suggests that most of the air carrier policies (both for transition into high performance aircraft and for retirement) were motivated by economic considerations. Also, there were remarkably few pilots with these companies approaching the various retirement age limits.
Review of "Pilot Aging Charts" by FAA's General Counsel's Office. Oct. 9, 1959 (88 Kb .pdf file)
FAA's staff attorneys review the FAA's (Quesada's) transition training time charts (from Smith's data), declares them inadequate justification for the Rule - and advises reliance on inexact "medical" issues, instead. Although both Smith and the FAA have previously advanced "medical issues" as justification, this appears to be the true basis for the FAA's later reliance on "medical uncertainties" when justifying and defending its Rule.
Comments on Draft Releases [NPRMs] Oct. 9, 1959 (312 Kb .pdf file)
FAA work paper analyzing public comments on its age 60 proposal.
FAA's "Legal Considerations" prompted by ALPA's comments Oct. 9, 1959 (452 Kb .pdf file)
FAA work paper analyzing ALPA's comments on the age 60 proposal. Explores and explains the legal considerations. Argues "periods of service" under Section 601 of the 1958 Federal Aviation Act (FAAct). (See p. 3.) But does Congress' "periods of service" in Section 601 refer to maximum hours the pilot may fly per day/week/month/year? Or does it mean, as FAA argues here, the "period of time" (service) between the minimum age of 23 and the maximum age of 60? Argues that the Rule does not "take" the pilot's license (a property right?), only limits its exercise.
Note: Enactment of the Age 60 Rule (without holding public hearings) was announced on Dec. 1, 1959, with the Final Rule published in the Federal Register on Dec. 5th, to become effective on March 15, 1960. A decision on the maximum age of 55 for transitioning into jets was delayed. That proposal was "set aside" after a public hearing held on Jan. 7, 1960. See below for a brief internal (FAA) analysis of the public hearing leading to that decision. See the "History" page to view copies of the relevant public documents.
Additional training data. Dec. 20, 1959 (56 Kb .pdf file)
Quesada is still gathering transition training time data with which to justify the Rule - even after his legal department has declared such data "not justification," and the Rule had already been published.
U.S. pilot retirements & pensions - 1959 Dec. 30, 1959 (244 Kb .pdf file)
A survey of proposed retirements and pensions of the major U.S. carriers in years 1960, and 1960-63. Survey conducted by the carrier's Air Transport Ass'n. Note the captain's average pension in 1959 -- $4,930.54 per year!
USAF older pilot accident data. Jan. 13, 1960 (208 Kb .pdf file)
A little belatedly, the Air Force here provides its "Accident Rates of Pilots in Upper Age Brackets."
Summary of the Age 55 Transition Limit hearing. Feb. 14, 1960 (148 Kb .pdf file)
This is the only item we've found that memorializes the public hearing held on Jan. 7, 1960 for the age-55 transition limit. Note page 2, para. 4.a.(2) characterizing the Air Force accident experience. Quite obviously these comments are derived from something other than the Air Force letter of a month before (Jan. 13th), reproduced above.
In preparation
FAA Memo, Louise Coomes. Jul. 11, 1973 (148 Kb .pdf file)
It appears on its face that the FAA "lost" the entire Age-60 Docket in 1971 rather than reveal it to the court in O'Donnel v. Shaffer.
DOT Memo to Secretary of Transportation. Oct. 11, 1979 (104 Kb .pdf file)
Advises the Secretary to stay out of the then active Congressional effort to raise the Rule's age limit.
More in preparation.
HISTORY
In late 1979, a group known as The Pilots Rights Association succeeded in getting a Bill reported out of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation (H.R. 3948, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.) on the Age 60 Rule. As originally proposed, it would have prevented the FAA from enforcing any age below 65. By the time it came out of Committee, however, the age limit had been reduced to 61 1/2 - and a study added. The Bill was further amended during debate on the house floor to delete the age limit, ordering only the study by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Subsequently signed into law it became Public Law 96-171, An Act to require a study of the desireability of mandatory age retirement for certain pilots, and for other purposes. Dec. 29, 1979. (104 Kb. .pdf file.)
Earlier - when the FAA saw that the Bill might actually come out of Committee, they took action "to head off [the] legislative action." An internal DOT memorandum to the Secretary of Transportation dated October 11, 1979 reports on this effort, and informs the Secretary that the matter should be left to the FAA because it had no political support - i.e.,the airlines, ALPA, and organized labor are all opposed to change, and no senior citizens groups have rallied to the issue. See,Yaden (DOT) Memorandum to "The Secretary" dated October 11, 1979 (148 Kb. .pdf file)
The "action" referred to above was the Federal Air Surgeon (Homer Reighard) and Deputy Administrator (Quentin Taylor) arranging to have an "independent review of the whole age-60 matter" prepared through a sole-source, no bid contract issued to the firm of Goddard & Associates. See Procurement Request LKG-9-0266 (192 Kb. .pdf file). Since Dr. James L. Goddard - the principal of Goddard & Associates - had been Federal Air Surgeon prior to Dr. Reighard, himself, and was known to be a strong advocate for the Rule, the public perception was that he could be neither "independent" nor "objective." When Administrator (Langhrne) Bond learned of the Goddard selection and public response, he became angry, demanding an explanation. Reighard's step-by-step reply is available at Memorandum, Federal Air Surgeon (AAM-1) to General Counsel's office (AGC-420),dated Jan. 14, 1980. (592 Kb. .pdf file).
As Reighard recounts, they first considered cancelling the contract, then tried to "cover" themselves by having a different independent review of the Goddard study to insure its "impartiality." To this end they approached the NIH or NIA, then the American Medical Association, then the Institutes of Medicine - all of whom refused. See, pages 5-7, Reighard memorandum.
The final report (with attachments) "A Reassessment of the Rationale for the Establishment of Federal Aviation Regulation 14 CFR 121.383(c), Goddard & Associates, 1979," runs to approximately 500 pages. I (Woolsey) know of no reference to this study other than that by Dr. William Hark to the GAO in 1989. See, 1989 GAO Report GAO/RCED-90-45FS, Information on FAA's Age 60 Rule for Pilots, p. 17. Should be available from the FAA.
1960-69: The Georgetown Clinical Research Institute and Lovelace Foundation aging studies
BACKGROUND
The "official" history of these two studies is presented on the HISTORY pages, under the 1960's decade. The documents presented and described here reveal the "behind the scene" action that appears to have, at least in part, led to the premature termination of the Lovelace Foundation study. Except for the two so identified, the following documents are all from the Reighard files. (See above for an explanation of this group of documents.)
As early as 1965, preliminary data being collected and analyzed in the Lovelace study was strongly suggestive that piloting abilities were unlikely to be affected by age, per se, and that these early results could well "prove to be of permanent value." See pp. 26-27 of the 1965 progress report, Study of Physiological and Psychological Aging, Lovelace Foundation, July, 1965.
Considering the significance of the Lovelace research reported to date, then, it is surprising to discover that just one year after abandoning their own GCRI project, the FAA's Federal Air Surgeon, Dr. Pete Siegel, asks Lovelace to abandon its study of older pilots in favor of younger ones instead. See Siegel-Schwichtenberg correspondence re: Lovelace Foundation aging study. Jan. 12, 1967. (Siegel's observation that the pilots had begun "to accept the rule" was obviously incorrect. If even arguably true at that moment - he was soon to receive a rude awakening. See below, re: Poe v. Butterfield, initiated in 1969)
Lovelace obviously rejected this suggestion.
NOTE: The next three documents are not from the Reighard files:
In the 1960's, Dr. Siegel created and relied on a small, informal group of outside consultants for professional advice, nominally led by a Dr. Charles Barron, Medical Director of Lockheed Aircraft. On Dec. 8, 1968, Drs. Siegel & Barron led this group (called for this purpose the Age 60 Sub-committee) on a visit to the Lovelace Foundation to receive a briefing on the Foundation's aging research. See List of attendees, both FAA & Lovelace. The visit is memorialized in Minutes prepared and maintained by the Lovelace Foundation. (Two extracts are presented below, but the document - at 180 pages - is far too large to reproduce here.)
Early in the Foundation's presentation, Lovelace's principal investigator, Dr. Robert Proper, presents a chart showing that older airline pilots enjoy a lower incidence of cardiovascular disease as compared to three other population groups (significantly lower than the general population), states that they "appear to be 10 years younger" in cardiovascular terms than other similar populations, and adds that "this trend is apparent by the fourth decade." The FAA group immediately interruupts with questions, with Dr. Siegel seeming to challenge the data by asserting that even the FAA does not know "the incidence of myocardial infarction among airline pilots." See pp. 3-10, remarks of Dr. Proper. Presentation of Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Pilot Aging, Federal Air Surgeon's Committee, Study of Physiologoc and Psychologic Aging in Pilots, Lovelace Foundation, Dec. 9, 1968 (660 Kb .pdf file)
As the formal presentation comes to a close, Drs. Siegel & Barron repeatedly complain that the Lovelace data will become public - and be used by others (including third parties) to undermine the FAA's medical justification for and its continued defense of the Rule. Note, particularly, Dr. Barron's immediate order to hold until a later executive session the question of the possibility of waivers to the Rule - posed by the only pilot in the group (Harry Orlady - at pp. 174-75). See pp. 172-176, concluding discussion. Dec. 9th Presentation. (544 Kb .pdf file)
NOTE: Returning to documents from the Reighard files:
Five months later, as nominal leader of the visiting Sub-committee, Dr. Barron submits a report/review of their visit, and of the Lovelace study overall - from the FAA's very narrow point of view. Letter, Barron to Siegel (Fed. Air Surgeon). May 1, 1969 (228 Kb .pdf file)
Retained as a part of the Reighard files is an internal review of the Barron report. Note the second paragraph - FAA is worried about legal challenges based on the Lovelace data. FAA staff review of Barron-Siegel Lovelace report. 30 Jul. 1969 (188 Kb .pdf file)
NOTE: NIH funding agency for the Lovelace aging study - made their own staff visit to Lovelace on Feb. 13, 1969 - occurred in roughly July, 1969, not long after Barron's critical "report" had been prepared and sent to Siegel.
Confirming Siegel's and Barron's concerns that the Lovelace data would become the basis for challenge to the Rule (December 8th minutes) - and belying Siegel's earlier observation that the pilots had by then "accepted" the Rule (his letter to Schwichtenberg of Jan. 12, 1967) - Poe v. Butterfield, (12 Aviation Cas. (CCH) 18,293 (D.D.C. 1974)) is initiated, a request for waivers based almost exclusively on the Lovelace aging pilot data. Siegel addresses a letter to NIH, seeking a copy of the NIH site review report (the one performed on Feb. 13, 1969) that became the basis for NIH's funding termination. Siegel complains (second paragraph) "The basis of the suit is almost entirely the Lovelace study which is cited throughout the brief." Letter, Siegel to Sherman (NIH) 15 Jan. 1970 (96 Kb .pdf file)
NIH politely refuses to provide a copy of its site-review report - noting the need for confidentiality for its reviewers. But note the next-to-last paragraph: "I would think that the site visit made by you and your staff in November [actually December] provided you with a fairly complete scientific evaluation of the Lovelace study." This suggests that the NIH view of the Lovelace study paralleled that expressed in the Barron letter of May 1st. Letter, Sherman (NIH) to Siegel, Jan. 27, 1970, NIH reply to Siegel's request (152 Kb .pdf file)
Since the minutes of the December 8th meeting were confidential - and Barron's letter to Siegel similarly privileged, the question arises as to how Sherman (NIH) could have become privy to those concerns and opinions. The answer is given, at least in part, in an undated, hand-written note from "Pete" Siegel to "Rick" Reighard discussing the impact of the NIH refusal. Note the second paragraph: "In Earl Carters [sic] Report he followed the main points of the Review groups [sic] Comments in his comments to us. So we have the body of it anyway." [Emphasis added.]undated note: Siegel to Reighard. (72 Kb .pdf file)
In recent conversations and correspondence between myself (Woolsey) and Dr. Earl Carter (Spring, 2001), Dr. Carter (participant in the December 8th, 1968 FAA-Lovelace visit) states that he did not participate in the NIH review process. Dr. Carter also states that although he might have (indeed, would have if asked), he does not recall having any contact with the NIH funding review process. Dr. Carter confirms that he was (and remains to this day) critical of the Lovelace study and its findings - specifically from the FAA's aging pilot perspective - because it immediately excluded from its study any pilot who became ill (disqualified from flying). In Dr. Carter's view - both then and now - this did not advance the FAA's goal of developing criteria for permitting the aged pilot to continue in his job. Dr. Carter states emphatically that, in his view, performance evaluations in today's advanced, virtual-reality simulators is the best test of a pilot's ability to continue in his profession.
1979 Goddard & Associates Study
1981 NIA Experienced Pilots Study
1983 Golaszewski Flight Time Study
HISTORY
In preparation
Letter, Chin (FAA) to Woolsey, re: Flight Time Study. Jul. 24, 1991 (72 Kb .pdf file)
Analysis of Flight Time Study - Drachman (784 Kb .pdf file)
Golaszewski's Professional Qualifications - circa: 1990 (148 Kb .pdf file)
ABC 20-20 "Too Old Too Soon," Feb. 9, 1990 (768 Kb .pdf file)
HISTORY
In preparation.
Declaration of Frank Austin, MD. Frank Austin replaced Dr. Reighard as Federal Air Surgeon after Reighard retired in 1984. (168 Kb .pdf file)
Austin-Mohler Letters (200 Kb .pdf file)
1989 GAO Report on the Age 60 Rule
In preparation.
1990 GAO Report on Medical Certification Standards
In preparation.
In preparation.
OTA Study (1 Mb .pdf file)
Analysis of OTA Study - Koonce (304 Kb .pdf file)
Analysis of OTA Study - Drachman (784 Kb .pdf file)
1991 Golaszewski Pilot Proficiency Study
In preparation.
1993 The Hilton System's Consolidated Database Study
HISTORY
In 1986, a group of pilots petitioned the FAA for exemptions from the Age 60 Rule claiming, inter alia, that the older pilot's greater experience outweighed any undetectable decriment associated with age. (Aman v FAA, 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir., 1988)) Upon appeal from the FAA's denial, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the agency for further consideration of that issue. The pilots repetitioned on that, and other issues, in 1989. Upon the FAA's second denial, the pilots once again appealed. Reluctantly ruling for the FAA, the court majority declared: "We are not in a positon to say that the numerous supporters of the petitioners' case are wrong. And it is obvious that the FAA must enhance its efforts to accomodate [the pilots'] point of view." (Baker v FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir., 1990))
One such effort was a 2-year 4-part study by Hilton Systems, Inc., one part of which was a "Consolidated Database Study" to conduct statistical analysis of the relationship between pilot age and accident rates. (Kay, E.J., et al, Age 60 Project,Consolidated Database Experiments, Final Report, Hilton Systems Technical Report 8025-3C(R2): CAMI Contract No. DTFA-02-90-90125) The FAA's contract to Hilton Systems explicitly declared "this study is not intended to finally establish causal relationships between age and accident rates. The quality of the available data will not support suc relationships." [See: Statement of Work, p. 2 (152 Kb. .pdf file)]
Despite this caveat, concluding remarks in the Summary and Discussion, (300 Kb. .pdf file), did identify such a "causal relationship," and even made a specific recommendation therefrom: "[t]aken together, these analyses give a hint, and a hint only, of an increase in accident rate for Class III pilots older than 63 years of age. This suggests that one could cautiously increase the retirement age to age 63." (Final paragraph, p. 6-3.)
However - A careful reading of these three pages reveals a significant change in both tone and thrust at the next-to-last paragrah, p. 6-2, continuing on p. 6-3. A query to the FAA's Contract Monitor revealed that these paragraphs were added to the report (and only these paragraphs) after The Contract Monitor had concluded that, as originally submitted without these paragraphs, the report did not support retention of the Age 60 Rule (in her words: "revealed that the Emperor wore no clothes"), and would not have been acceptable to the agency. She therefore prevailed upon the statistician to reevaluate the data - and come up with an age, some age, any age that the FAA could defend.
See:
Letter, Woolsey, S. to Della Rocca FAA Contract Manager, Consolidated Database Study dtd. Aug. 19, 1993 (172 Kb. .pdf file)
See also:
Letter, Woolsey, S. to Della Rocca dtd. Sept. 13, 1993 (216 Kb. .pdf file)
And to see the effects of including/excluding the "outliers," See
Graphs prepared from data in the CDB Report, Table B-10B, p. B-12 (supporting Fig. 5-10 in Section 5, Results.) (44 Kb. .pdf file)
Absent these maneuvers by the Contract Monitor and statistician - the report would have concluded with the observations: "Our analyses provided no support for the hypothesis that the pilots of scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of 60. ... The data for all the various groups of pilots were remarkably consistent in showing a modest decrease in accident rate with age, a trend shared by the data of Fig 5-5." [Air carrier pilots.]
Woolsey, S.: Amicus Brief in PPF v. FAA, 1994
More to come.
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